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BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) Utah Code Annotated, as amended and now in
effect, and pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure,
ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1.

Does the final decision in the prior action

(District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil No. C-89-3339)
between the same parties bar Appellees' claims in this action on
grounds of res judicata?
Standard of Review;

A grant of summary judgment is

mandated where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party (Appellee in this matter) is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

Reeves v. Geioy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d

636, 642 (Utah 1988), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S.
317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In deciding

whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment, the
appellate court shall review the same for correctness and gives
no deference to the trial court's view of the law.

Utah State

Coal, of Sr. Citizens v. UP&L, 776 P.2d 632 (Utah 1989).

Neither

will the appellate court give deference to the lower court's
legal conclusions concerning whether material facts are in
dispute.

Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821r 825

(Utah App. 1989) .
ISSUE 2.

Is the judgment of the District Court in the

prior action subject to attack by decision of the Circuit Court?
Standard of Review:

Same as in Issue 1 above.

ISSUE 3. Were the Appellant's obligations under the
Uniform Real Estate Contract which was the subject of the prior
action in the District Court discharged by payment in full of the
purchase price, thereby barring Appellees' claim for taxes, water
assessment, attorney's fees, or interest in the subsequent action
in the Circuit Court?
Standard of Review:
ISSUE 4.

Same as in Issue 1 above.

Did Appellants raise genuine issues of

material fact regarding:
(a) Whether the issue of payment of taxes and water
assessments was excluded as an issue from the trial in
the prior action in the District Court.
(b) Whether the attorney's fees were reasonable, and
whether the trial court could make that determination

-2-

on affidavit without a hearing and without a supporting
finding of fact.
Standard of Review:
ISSUE 5.

Same as in Issue 1 above.

Did the Circuit Court err in denying

Appellants' motion for summary judgment?
Standard of Review;
ISSUE 6.

Same as in Issue 1 above.

Were the issues raised by Appellants properly

preserved below?
Standard of Review;

Issues not raised in the trial

court cannot be considered on appeal. LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel
Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482-483 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Not applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Plaintiffs/Appellees, Robert

H. Covington and Mary C. Whetman, as the co-personal
representatives of the Estate of Douglas B. Covington (the
"Covingtons"), brought this action in the court below in July,
1992f seeking reimbursement for real property taxes and water
assessments that they had paid in May of 1992 pursuant to the
terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract between
Defendants/Appellants, John C. Josephson and Geraldine C.
Josephson (the MJosephsonsM) as buyers, and Douglas B. Covington
-3-

and Alice H. Covington, as sellers (the "Contract").

The

Josephsons raised only one defense, claiming that the Covingtons7
were barred by res judicata, and citing the District Court's
decision in a prior action between the same parties involving
title to the Josephsons7 property, in Estate of Covington v.
Josephson, Civ. No. C-89-3339, Dec. 18, 1991, Salt Lake County,
Utah.

The terms of the Contract are not in dispute.

The

Josephsons do not claim to have paid the taxes and assessments
for which reimbursement is sought, but only to have paid all
principal and interest due under the Contract.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The Covingtons filed an

action in the Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on
July 7, 1992.

Both parties made motions for summary judgment,

which were argued to the lower court.

The Josephsons have

appealed the lower court's decision in favor of the Covingtons
and filed their brief with this Court.
C.

Disposition At Trial Court.

Upon cross-motions

for summary judgment by the Covingtons and the Josephsons, the
court below granted summary judgment in favor of the Covingtons:
(1) awarding damages in the amount of $3,370.70, plus costs of
$141.40, attorney's fees of $3,127.50 and interest on the sum of
$3,440.70 at the "contract rate of 3/4's of one percent per month
from May 8, 1992, until date hereof" on the judgment and
-4-

F.

On May 8, 1992, the Covingtons sold the Covington

G.

On or about the date of sale of the Covington

Property.

Property, the Covingtons paid the taxes due and owing on the
Josephson property, in the amount of $3,377.15, and water
assessments with regard to the Josephsons' water stock in the
amount of $63.55.
H.

(See Affidavit of Mary C. Whetman).

The Covingtons were required to pay the property

taxes on their own property and on the Josephson Property in
connection with the sale of the Covington Property because the
parcels had been jointly assessed, and unless all taxes covered
by the assessment were paid they could not have delivered clear
title to the purchasers of their property.

(See Affidavit of

Mary C. Whetman).
I. Although unknown to the Covingtons at the time, the
Josephsons were part of the group which purchased the Covington
Property.

The Josephsons did not at the time of that purchase,

nor have they since, objected to the Covington's payment of the
taxes and assessments on their property.

(See Affidavit of Mary

C• Whetman)•
J.

In May of 1989, the Covingtons commenced a suit

against the Josephsons in the District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, Case No. C-89-3339, seeking a declaration that the
-7-

Covington Property was not subject to a right-of-way in favor of
the Josephsons, for damages for slander of title and trespass,
and for an injunction restraining the Josephsons from continuing
to use the right-of-way.

The Josephsons counterelaimed against

the Covingtons asking the Court to quiet title in them to a
right-of-way across a portion of the Covington Property, award
them five shares of water stock and declare that the Contract was
"fully paid and performed by Josephsons, and Josephsons are
entitled to conveyance" of the Josephson Property.

(See

Complaint and Answer and Counterclaim attached as Addendum
Exhibits "C" and "D").
K.

The Covingtons filed a Reply to the Counterclaim.

They denied, on information and belief, "that the [Josephsons]
have performed said obligations" under the Contract, and admitted
that, upon full performance, Josephsons would be entitled to a
conveyance under the Contract of the Josephson Property, but
without the right-of-way.

[See Reply attached as Addendum

Exhibit "E").
L.

The District Court case was tried to the Court

without a jury, Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, in June
1991, and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment were
ultimately entered on December 18, 1991, quieting title in the
Josephsons to the Josephson Property, recognizing the claimed
-8-

right-of-way, and awarding $4,000 attorney fees.

(See District

Court Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "F").
M.

The judgment in the District Court case did not

address the issue of taxes and assessments paid on the Josephson
Property by the Covingtons.

Rather, the claims and subsequent

determination of the District Court case focused solely on the
existence and use of the right-of-way in question.

(See

District Court Judgment).
N.

On several occasions prior to the District Court

trial regarding the right-of-way, and on at least one occasion
during the trial, the Josephsons' attorney, Mr. Robert Cummings,
represented to the Covingtons' attorney and to the Court that the
Josephsons would pay any taxes and water assessments which were
due on their parcel.

He stated to the Court (and the Covingtons

and their counsel agreed) that the case before the Court was to
determine the existence of the right-of-way.

No issue or

question regarding payments under the Contract arose, as the
Covingtons acknowledged that no further amounts were then owed to
them under the Contract.

Neither side presented evidence at the

trial regarding any taxes or water assessments owed on the
Josephsons' property.

In fact, the Josephsons presented no

evidence at the trial, since the Josephsons' motion for a nonsuit
was granted at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. (See
-9-

Affidavit of Mary Whetman, Affidavit of David K. Broadbent
attached as Addendum Exhibit "G% and District Court Judgment).
0.

After paying the taxes and assessments jointly

assessed against the Covington Property and the Josephson
Property, the Covingtons made repeated demands upon the
Josephsons for reimbursement of the Josephsons, share of the
taxes and assessments.

(See Affidavit of David K. Broadbent

attached as Addendum Exhibit "G").

The Josephsons refused and

failed to repay such amounts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

Issues II, III, and IV raised by the

Josephsons were not presented to the court below and are
therefore not properly before this Court pursuant to LeBaron &
Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482-483 (Utah 1991).
POINT II. The Covingtons' claim for repayment of taxes
and assessments is not barred by res judicata inasmuch as it is
neither the same claim nor cause of action made in the prior case
between the parties, and is not barred by collateral estoppel
because it does not involve the same issues as the prior case.
POINT III. The Uniform Real Estate Contract upon which
Covingtons' claim is based clearly required the Josephsons to pay
taxes and assessments and obligated them to reimburse the
Covingtons should the Covingtons pay them.
-10-

The Covingtons were

required to pay the Josephsons7 taxes and assessments because
they were also assessed against the Covington property under a
joint assessment, and the Josephsons have failed to reimburse the
Covingtons for the amounts so paid.
POINT IV.

The Josephsons7 payment of principal and

interest under the Contract does not relieve them of their
separate obligation to pay taxes and assessments against their
property.

The Covingtons are entitled to reimbursement of taxes

and assessments paid on the Josephsons7 property, even though
they paid them after the purchase price under the Contract was
paid.
POINT V.

No material issues exist which would

preclude summary judgment.

The Josephsons have not denied that

the Covingtons paid the taxes and assessments which are the
subject of this action, and have not claimed to have reimbursed
the amounts demanded of them.
POINT VI. The Affidavit of Attorneys Fees submitted to
the trial court met the requirements established by the Code of
Judicial Administration and by applicable case law.

In addition,

the Josephsons7 failure to object to the Affidavit or otherwise
to the reasonableness of the Covingtons7 attorneys fees precludes
their belated objection on appeal.

-11-

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

OTHER THAN ISSUES 1 AND 5, THE JOSEPHSONS'

ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AS THE JOSEPHSONS DID
NOT PRESERVE THEM IN THE LOWER COURT.
On appeal, the Josephsons raise five separate issues,
only two of which were raised in the court below, namely,
Appellants' Issues I and V.

Because the Josephsons did not raise

the additional issues prior to this time, such issues are not now
properly before this Court on appeal. LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel
Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482-483 (Utah 1991).

As noted in

LeBaron, in order to preserve a substantive issue on appeal, a
party must bring the issue to the attention of the trial court,
"thus providing an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits."
LeBaron at 483.

Failure to do so precludes the appellate court

from considering their merits on appeal.

Id.

Accordingly,

Issues II through IV are not within the scope of the appeal to
this Court.
POINT II. THE COVINGTONS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
The Covingtons' claim for reimbursement of taxes and
assessments paid by them under the terms of the Contract is
properly raised in this suit.

The Covingtons' claims were not,

and could not have been, addressed in the prior District Court
-12-

litigation between the parties, because the cause of action
asserted in this case did not arise until after the District
Court action was decided.

In the prior case, the Covingtons

sought to prevent the Josephsons' use of an alleged right-of-way
located on the Covington Property, and the Josephsons sought to
establish their claim to the right-of-way.

After the conclusion

of the Covingtons' case in chief, the District Court granted
Josephsons' motion for nonsuit and entered judgment in favor of
the Josephsons.

No claims were made nor evidence presented

regarding taxes and assessments, nor, for that matter, regarding
other payments under the Contract.

[Judgment, R. 25]. The

District Court's Judgment identified the nature of the litigation
before it, in stating that "plaintiffs are not entitled to relief
on their Complaint" and that "defendants are entitled to the
right-of-way . . . ."

[District Court Judgment, R. 26].

The

Covingtons' complaint had not requested any payments under the
Contract nor alleged that any were due. The Covingtons did not
dispute the Josephsons' claim that they had paid all amounts owed
to the Covingtons under the Contract, and had no claim against
the Josephsons until they were forced to pay the taxes and
assessments in order to sell their remaining property.

Except

for the fact that the Josephsons' Property was jointly assessed
with their own property, the Covingtons were not concerned with
-13-

the Josephsons' payment of taxes.

The Covingtons had no reason

to pay the Josephsons' share of the taxes until they were engaged
in the sale of their own property, and then only because they had
to pay the taxes in order to deliver clear title to their
purchasers.

[R. 72]

Had it not been for the sale of their

property, the Covingtons could have waited for the County to
assess the Covington Property and the Josephson Property
separately .
A claim of res judicata does not deliver the windfall
sought by the Josephsons.

As explained by the Supreme Court in

Schaer v. State By & Through Dept. of Transportation. 657 P.2d
1337 (Utah 1983) , res judicata requires the same cause of action,
claim or demand.

Id. at 1340.

The prior litigation in Schaer

was a condemnation action in which the plaintiff/landowner had
contended that he was entitled to severance damages because his
remaining property was effectively landlocked as a result of the
condemnation.

The findings of fact included a finding that the

condemnation resulted in no reasonable access to the plaintiff's
remaining property.

In the subsequent litigation, the landowner

requested a ruling that a Mdugway road", which could have
provided access to his property, had become a public thoroughfare
and was therefore available for access suitable for residential
development.

In opposing the landowner's motion for summary
-14-

judgment and in arguing for summary judgment in its favor, the
State argued that the plaintiff was precluded from maintaining
his claim by operation of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
In the Schaer case, the Supreme Court rejected the res judicata
defense.

The Court grounded its holding in reasoning that res

judicata is inapplicable where the two cases rested on a
different state of facts, where evidence of a different kind or
character was necessary to sustain the two cases, and where the
two claims related to different time periods.
Here, as in Schaer, the parties' claims and causes of
action are quite distinct.

The Covingtons' claims for relief in

the District Court action were to quiet title to the disputed
right-of-way, and were not to recover for payment of taxes and
assessments.

The Josephsons' counterclaim sought conveyance of

the Josephson Property, including the disputed right-of-way.

In

contrast, the matter now before this Court is limited to a
distinct claim and facts which arose well after the District
Court litigation was concluded.

Almost a year after the

District Court trial, and several months after the final judgment
in that case was entered, the Covingtons paid real property taxes
and water assessments which were jointly assessed against their
property and the Josephson Property. [R. 72] The Covingtons then
brought this action for reimbursement of the amounts they had
-15-

paid after the Josephsons refused to reimburse the payments made
on their behalf.

The Covingtons' claim was not ripe until after

the prior action had been terminated.

Under the terms of

paragraph 14 of the Contract, they were not entitled to
reimbursement until after they had made payment themselves and
then made demand upon the Josephsons•
Furthermore, the Covingtons' claims do not raise issues
which are identical to those litigated in their prior case
against the Josephsons. Their current claims are not, therefore,
barred by the principles of collateral estoppel.
The Supreme Court and this Court have identified the
four-part test to be used in determining whether application of
collateral estoppel is appropriate.

In Schaer, supra, the

Supreme Court identified the four elements as:
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in
question?
2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?
4.

Was the issue in the first case competently, fully,

and fairly litigated?
-16-

In articulating the four elements of collateral estoppel in
Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah App. 1992) this
Court substituted the word "completely" for "competently" in
stating the fourth element.

If any one of the elements is not

satisfied, then the issue may be litigated, and is not barred.
In Schaer, supra. the Supreme Court analyzed the
defendant's collateral estoppel challenge after holding that the
plaintiff's claims survived defendant's res judicata attack.
There, as in the case before this Court, the focus was on whether
the first and fourth tests - identity of the issues and full and
fair litigation - were satisfied.

In determining whether the

issue decided in the previous action was identical to that tried
in the subsequent action, the Supreme Court articulated the
standard that the issues actually litigated in the first action
must be "precisely the same as those raised in the [subsequent]
action."

Id. at 1341.

In Schaer, the earlier litigation was a

condemnation action which focused on whether the plaintiff's
remaining property was effectively landlocked.

The Supreme Court

reasoned that the identity of issues necessary to support a
finding of collateral estoppel was not present in the subsequent
action.

"Despite vague and indirect references to the dugway

road, [the prior litigation] had not focused on the precise issue
of whether the dugway road was a public thoroughfare" under the
-17-

applicable statute.

Id. at 1341. The Court observed that the

findings of fact in the prior case, even though stating that no
reasonable access existed, did not purport to rule conclusively
on the status of the dugway road "for all time."

It further

stated that "neither the findings nor the judgment entered [in
the prior litigation] demonstrates that the court considered and
ruled on the precise issue in this case, namely, whether the
dugway road met the requirements of U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-80."
Id. at 1341.
Similarly, in the present case, the District Court's
statement that the Contract had been "paid in full" did not speak
to obligations of the Josephsons that had not yet arisen nor
entitle them to avoid those obligations when they matured.
Likewise, the defendants in Schaer presented no evidence to
contest the facts presented in plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, but relied exclusively on the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Schaer
plaintiff, and this Court should do so here.
Appellants' collateral estoppel claim is similar to the
one rejected in Mackintosh, supra.

The trial court in that case

had determined that a claim was barred by collateral estoppel and
granted summary judgment for defendants.
-18-

On appeal, the Court of

Appeals reversed, basing its holding on defendant's failure to
demonstrate adequate identity of the issues.

Id. at 1301.

In

the first suit, Mackintosh was sued by a Utah limited partnership
to quiet title in a particular tract of land, and for slander of
title caused by a notice of interest he had filed against the
tract.

Mackintosh counterclaimed, asserting that he had a ten

percent interest in the land due to an oral agreement with the
partnership.

His counterclaim was dismissed because the oral

agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds.

In the

second suit, however, Mackintosh claimed he had "an agreement for
monetary compensation" with the partnership, not "an agreement
for an interest in real property."

Id. at 1301.

The Court of

Appeals determined that the second suit's claim was not barred
because Mackintosh had raised different issues in his second
suit, even though the later claims were based on the same oral
agreement.
The Covingtons are in an even better position than
Mackintosh, inasmuch as their claims did not arise until after
the first suit was over.

In Mackintosh, however, the plaintiff's

claim for compensation under the oral agreement could have been
raised in the first lawsuit, but was not.
Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.. 635 P.2d 417 (Utah
1981), demonstrates that the standard of "precision" necessary
-19-

for issue identity is very high, and that Courts will closely
scrutinize the issues.

In Wilde, insureds brought an action

against their no-fault insurer for additional no-fault benefits
for lost wages and household services.

The Supreme Court found

that the issue of lost wages had been litigated in an earlier
action against the third-party tort feasor, but that issues
regarding plaintiff's disability may not have been.

Accordingly,

the insureds were collaterally estopped from relitigating the
lost wages issue, but not the question of their disability.
The Josephsons' claim also fails to meet the fourth
element of collateral estoppel, that the issue in the first case
be completely, competently, fully and fairly litigated.

As

stated in the uncontroverted affidavits of Mary Whetman and David
K. Broadbent, no argument or evidence was presented in the first
case regarding any amounts owing under the contract, whether for
principal, interest, or otherwise, and certainly not about taxes
or assessments.

[R. 63, 72]

The parties acknowledged that their

dispute was about the right-of-way, and that the sole issue was
whether it had to be included in the conveyance of the Josephson
Property.

Accordingly, it cannot be said the issue of payment of

taxes and assessments was litigated at all, let alone fully,
fairly and completely or competently.

-20-

As in the Mackintosh case, the initial litigation
between the parties to this action addressed the parties'
competing claims to real property, more particularly, a right-ofway.

Here, however, the Covingtons are seeking reimbursement,

pursuant to the terms of the Contract, for tax and assessment
payments made by them after the first case was concluded.
While both actions involved the same Uniform Real Estate
Contract, the first case focused on disputed interpretation and
scope of the property to be conveyed under the contract, namely,
whether it entitled the Josephsons to a right-of-way.

The

present case involves no real property interests, nor issues of
interpretation of the Contract, but simply the Josephson's
obligation to reimburse the Covingtons for taxes and assessments,
an indebtedness which would be undisputed but for the Josephsons7
claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
In summary, the defenses of res judicata or collateral
estoppel are illusory.

No claims for payments of any nature or

amount were made in the prior action, and no issues arose
regarding such matters.

In fact, the District Court would have

committed obvious error if it had determined that the Covingtons
were owed reimbursement for taxes or assessments, since they had
not yet paid the taxes and assessments sought here.
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POINT III. THE CONTRACT UNAMBIGUOUSLY ENTITLES THE
COVINGTONS TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS WHICH THEY
PAID.
In clear and unmistakable terms, the Contract obligated
the Josephsons to "pay all taxes and assessments of every kind
and nature" which were or which might become due on the Property.
Further, if the Covingtons paid taxes and assessments on the
Josephson Property upon the Josephsons' failure to do so, the
Josephsons agreed to *repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums
so advanced and paid, . . . together with interest thereon from
date of payment . . . ." As yet, the Josephsons have failed to
make any such repayment notwithstanding the Covingtons' demand.
POINT IV.

PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE UNDER THE

CONTRACT DOES NOT RELIEVE THE JOSEPHSONS FROM THEIR OBLIGATION TO
PAY THE TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS ALSO DUE UNDER THE CONTRACT.
In Point III of Appellants' Brief, the Josephsons
assert that payment in full of the principal and interest due
under Contract means that the Contract has been terminated and
that no claim for reimbursement can be made thereunder.

Because

the Josephsons did not raise this issue below, it was not
preserved for appeal and is not now properly before this Court on
appeal.

LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479,

482-483 (Utah 1991).
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Moreover, a brief examination of the Josephsons' claim
reveals its substantive deficiencies.

In addition to principal

and interest, the Josephsons had the obligation under the
Contract to pay the taxes and assessments in question.

The

obligation was separate and distinct from their obligation to pay
the purchase price under the Contract, and, under the express
terms of the Contract, the Covingtons' claim for reimbursement
did not mature until they had actually paid the taxes and
assessments.

The Affidavit submitted by John Josephson in

opposition to Covington's motion for summary judgment, and the
Draper Bank escrow record attached thereto, addressed only
payments of principal and interest under the Contract.

[R. 47]

Neither the affidavit nor the escrow records mention the
Josephsons' obligation to pay taxes and insurance, which from the
inception of the Contract were handled outside of the Draper Bank
escrow.

While the purchase price required under the Contract

may have been paid in full, the Josephsons were still required
under the terms of the Contract to pay property taxes and
assessments, either directly to the County and water company, or
indirectly by reimbursing the Covingtons following their payment
of these items. Notwithstanding the technical arguments to the
contrary, the simple fact remains that the Josephsons failed to
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make the required payments; and the Covingtons were forced to pay
them in order to sell their property.
BLT Investment Company v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah
1978), cited by the Josephsons, is inapposite.

That case

discusses the legal effect of rescission, stating that the effect
of rescission is as though the contract "never had any
existence.M

Id. at 458. That case clearly does not apply to

this action.

The Contract was neither rescinded nor terminated.

To the contrary, it was the very viability of the Contract that
both parties relied on to resolve the prior District Court case
and is the basis of this action.
POINT V.

THE COVINGTONS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AS NO MATERIAL FACTUAL ISSUE EXISTS.
The Josephsons argue that the affidavits of the parties
below raise factual issues which the court below should have
tried.

This claim is based on the assertion that the affidavit

of John C. Josephson disputes the facts contained in the
affidavits of Mary C. Whetman and David K. Broadbent.

Mr.

Josephson's affidavit is attached as Addendum Exhibit "H".
Even viewing the contents of the Josephson affidavit in
the light most favorable to the Josephsons, this assertion is
unfounded.

Mr. Josephson's statement that he fully performed his

duties under the Contract, "as demonstrated by the attached
-24-

statement of Draper Bank," [R. 47] does not conflict with the
affidavit of Mrs. Whetman regarding taxes and assessments, and
goes only to the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
discussed above. Mr. Josephson's affidavit and the Draper Bank
statement address only principal and interest due under the
Contract, and not the taxes and assessments which are the subject
of this dispute. [R. 47] Mr. Josephson has not claimed to have
paid the taxes and assessments which are the subject of this
action or disputed the fact that the Covingtons have paid them.
The Broadbent and Whetman affidavits specifically address the
Covingtons' payment of property taxes and assessments and the
demands made for reimbursement therefor. [R. 63 and 72]

They

also state that no evidence was presented and no argument was
made in the prior action in the District Court on the issue of
payment of taxes or assessments.

The Josephsons have not denied

these material and relevant facts, but in fact asserted that no
material facts were in issue when they moved and argued for
summary judgment in their favor.

[R. 39]

POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
WAS PROPER.
In Point IV of their argument, the Josephsons assert
that the lower court's award of attorney's fees was improper, and
cite Provo City Corporation v. Cropper, 497 P.2d 629 (Utah 1972).
-25-

That case simply states that the court is obligated to take
evidence on the issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees.
In this case, evidence of attorney's fees was presented in the
court below.

Specifically, the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees,

dated January 21, 1993, and executed by counsel to the Covingtons
constitutes such evidence. A copy of the Affidavit is attached
hereto as Addendum Exhibit "I." The contents of that Affidavit
comply with the express requirements of Rule 4-505 of the Code of
Judicial Administration.

Accordingly, the lower court's award of

attorney's fees was proper and is consistent with such Rule and
with the Cropper case.

See also LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin, 805

P.2d 189, 198 (Utah 1991).

Moreover, the Josephsons made no

objection to the Circuit Court regarding the amount of the fees
or the adequacy of the affidavit submitted in support of those
fees.

Because the issue was not raised below, under LeBaron &

Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 623 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991), it
should not be raised for the first time here.
CONCLUSION
The Covingtons are entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law because no genuine issue of material fact is in
dispute before this Court or the Court below.

This Court has

stated that, H[t]he Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a
'judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
-26-

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"

Kleinert v,

Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah App. 1993) (cites
omitted).

In Kleinert. this Court also stated that M[a]fter a

motion for summary judgment has been made . . ., the opposing
party may not rest on mere allegation or denial."

Id. This Court

continued, "[t]he opposing party's response must set forth
specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial."

Id.

The facts are undisputed that, following the court's
decision in the prior District Court action, the Covingtons paid
the property taxes and assessments on the Josephson Property upon
Josephsons' failure to do so, and that the Josephsons refused to
repay such taxes and assessment, as required under the Contract.
Mr. Josephson's affidavit does not raise disputes about material
facts.

The court below, therefore, properly granted the

Covingtons' motion for summary judgment.
Based upon the facts and discussion set forth above,
the Covingtons urge this Court to affirm the summary judgment
granted by the Circuit Court, requiring the Josephsons to
reimburse the amounts referred to in the lower court's decision.
Under paragraph 21 of the Contract, and pursuant to Management
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Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah
1980), the Covingtons are also entitled to their attorneys' fees
incurred in this appeal, together with the unpaid accruing
interest on the amounts due under the Contract and hereby request
an award of those fees and interest.
Respectfully submitted this

/(

day of January, 1994.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZABLER

.'Si

/CC^J^^+^-4^'

David K. Broadbent
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the /

t£J

/

day of January,

1994, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to the
following:
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq.
1130 West Center Street
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

c^tu^&u^j >J^aA^--
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit

Page of Record

"A"

Contract

29

"BM

Affidavit of Mary C. Whetman

72

"CH

District Court Complaint1

"D"

District Court Answer and Counterclaim

"EM

District Court Reply to Counterclaim

M

District Court Judgment

25

"G"

Affidavit of David K. Broadbent

63

"H"

Affidavit of John C. Josephson

47

"I"

Affidavit of David K. Broadbent

95

F"

1

The District Court Complaint, Counterclaim and Reply to
Counterclaim were not included in the record below. Copies are
included inasmuch as they were cited in Appellant's Brief to this
Court, and in the Covingtons' response.
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"THIS IS A L£GALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDfcRSTOOO. SEfc* C O M P E U N T ADVICE:

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
M
. aay of»V
1973
, A. D.. 19.
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this
Ilk.
by and between DOUGLAS E , COVTNCTON AND ALICE H . COVINGTON a k a ALICE HANSEN COVINGTON
hereinafter designated a, the Seller, and , „ J O " * C . JOS^PHSON AND CFRALDINE C , JOSEPHSCN,

h i s w i f e , as int ten and not as ten in comnon, with f u l l
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

Salt

rights of survivorship,.,

LaKeCitV » U t a h —

2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in
S a T t Lak»
_, State of Utah, to-wit:
the county of _
AOORCSS

More particularly described as follows:

BRG .at a point N 89°54'10" W 1320 f t fr th<? SE cor of Sec 3 5 , T2S,
R1E, SLBfcM and running th N O c 10*23" W 505.475 f t t o a noint on an old barbed
wire f e n c c l m e ; thence N 86°34'1C" W 265.41 f t ; th S 20°15» E 555,56? f t
to th? S l i n e of s a i d S e c 35; th along said S l i n e S 89°54 , 10" E 74.17 f t
to point of b e g ,
5
TOGETHER WITH X shares of Bdg Willow Irrigation water stock.
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of
SIXTPSN THOUSAND PIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY AND N O / 1 0 0
Dollars , j t 6 , B 3 0 « 0 0
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order _ TttAPER BANK MT> TRUST
•trictly within the followine time.. w-»i«: THR^g THOUSAND ANP N O / 1 0 0 - - cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of t

!

*

>_-

,T 3 . 0 0 0 . 0 0

\

}

shall be paid as follows:

$107.00 or more per month commencing June 10, 1973 and monthly thereafter
until principal balance together with accrued interest has been paid in full...
Any payment that becomes 15 days or more delinquent shall be charged a $5.00 '
per month late charge.
N«r. Covington shall retain use of bldgs on property for a period of 10 yearsM,i
if desired.
Buyer agrees to not hold seller liable for any future problems or litigation
with regard to boundary line discrepancy between survey and existing fence line
Seller agrees to assist buyer in any way possible to resolve problem*
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the

4th

day of

M*v

1973

1&-

4. Said monthly pay menu are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the
principal. Interest shall be charged from
5—4—73
on all unpaid portions of the
. per cent (
35
*?t \ per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime.
purchase price at the rate of .
a%
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made,
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract iess than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of

none

with an unpaid balance of

aa of .
7. Seller represent* that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop*
erty, except the following .

-no no

8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed

fi

percent

(
9r) per annum ami payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrregate monthly installment
payment* required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and mortgages the Seller »gree* to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to mukc application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under ihe regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in obtaining said loan, the Seller agreeing to nay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the p_ayment of his obligations against said property.

EXHIBIT "A

S-A-

12

The Buver ajrree* to par the reneral t a x e s alter .

]3

The Bu*er further agree* to keep all insurable building* arid improvement* on aaid premiaes insured in a com

pant acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not leu* than the unpaid balance on this contract or t . — H ' ?
mnd to asojrn said insurance to the Seller an his interest* ros* appear and to deliver the insurance poiicv to him
H In the event the Buver shaft default in the pa* men! of a m si**cial or general t a x e s assessment* or insuranre
premiums as herein provided the Seller m a \ at hut option j**} naid tax en assessment* and insurance premiums or cither
of tnem and if Seller elect* so to dt then the Huver agree* to w**\ tb» teller u?Km demand all such sums no advanced
and paid M him together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of ^ of or\9 percent per
month until paid
15 Hu\er agrees that he « i l l not commit or suffer to he committed anv waste spoil or destruction in or upon
said premises and that he will maintain said premises in jrood condition
K li the event of a failure to romph with the terms hereof b* the Buver or upon failure of the B u \ e r to make
a m p m m e n t or pavment? v.hen the same shall )«»come due or within
30
davs thereafter the
Seller at his option shall have the following alternative remedies
A Seller shall have the right UJMII failure of the Bu*er to remod* the default within five dnvs after written notire.
\i lie rt leased from ail obligations in lav. and in equit* to convex waid propert\ and all pa*mtnt« whirl have
been mart» theretofore oi this contract b* the Huvei shall l»e forfeited t< the t e l l e r a«» liquidated damages for
tb« non performance of the contract and th< Buver agrees that the ^< Ilrr ma\ at hi* option r e e n t e r and take
possession of said prcmisi s without Itral processes ns m its first und former e s t a t e topethcr w it! all imjirov.
ments and additions maoe \\ tne B u \ e r tnereon a i d the said additions and improvements shall remain with
th
land become the property of th
Selle
the Huver becoming ai onee a tenant at -will of the Seller or
B Th< Seller ms* bring suit and recover luorment lor all ritliiiouent installments includinr costs and a t t o r n e y
feet (The use of tnis remem on one or more occasions shall noi prevent the *>eller at his option from resoitmg
to one of the other remedies hcreund* r in tin event of a subsequent default)
or
C The Seller shall have the ripht at his option and upon written notice to tht Buxcr to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once du< and pavablc and max elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage and pass
title to the Buver subiect thereti and proceed immediate!* to foreclose the same in accordance wit! the laws of
the State of Utah and have the p r o p e m sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance ©wine
including cost* and attorne* s fees and the teller n u t have s judjrment for a m dcficiencr which m*^ remain
In the case of foreclosure the Seller hereunder upon the filing of a complaint shall he immediate!* entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged propert\ and collect the rents issue* and
profits therefrom nnd appl\ the same to the pavment of the obturation hereunder or hold thi same pursuant
to order of the court xr>d the Seller upon entr* of ;udpmcnt of foreclosure shall bf entitled to the possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption
17 It is apreed that time is the essence of this agreement
18 In the event there are a m hens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to or in the event anv liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue ajrainst the
same bv acts or neglect of the Seller then the Buver ma* at his option par and discharge the same and reretxe credit
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of anv such pa*ment or pax ments and thereafter the pa*
ments herein pro* ided to be made maj at the option of the Buver be niispznded
until such time a s such suspended
pa*ments shall equal anv sums advanced a s aforesaid
3° The Seller on receiving the pa*ments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
arree« to execute and deliver to the Buver or assigns a pood and sufficient warranty deed come*mg- the title to the
*bo*e described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as ma* have accrued
h* or through the acts or neplect of the Buver and to furnish at his expense a poliex of title insurance in the amount
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller an abstract brought to aatc at time of sale or at an* time during the
term of this agreement or at time of deliver* of deed at the optu n of Buver
20 It is hereb3 express)* understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buver acrent* the said propertv
in its present condition and that there are no representations covenants or agreements between tne parties hereto with
reference to said propertv except as herein specificalh

set forth or attached hereto

none
21 The B u t e r and Seller each agree that should the* default m ant of the covenants or agreements contained here
m that the defaulting part* shall par all co*t* and expenses including a reasonable attorne* s fee which mm arise
or accrue from enforcing" this agreement or in obtaining possession of the premise* covered herebj or in pursuing- an*
remedv provided hereunder or b* the s t a t u t e s of the State of Utah whether such remed* is pursued bv filing a suit
or othervnse
22 It i* understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to applv to and bind the heirs executors administrators sueccssors and a s s i g n s of the r e s p e c t n e partie« hereto
" W I T N E S S l T H E R E O F , the said parties to this agreement have hereunto sig-ned their names the da* and vear
flrstfaBo*. e written*
SifrnV

Seller

.&{f*uiLrx
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent (0442)
Thomas M. Melton (4999)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
MARY C. WHETMAN

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil NO.920009436CV
Judge Robin Reese

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:
)

ss.

Affiant, being duly sworn, does depose and state as
follows:
1.

I am one of the Co-Personal Representatives of the

Estate of Douglas B. Covington, am over 21 years of age and am
familiar with the facts of this case.
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EXHIBIT "B'

2.

From May, 1973, and continuing throughout the

course of our dealings with the Josephsons with regard to the
property they purchased under contract from my parents, property
taxes have been assessed jointly against their property and our
remaining adjacent property, and each party has been responsible
for its share of the taxes.

The Josephsons have never objected

to that treatment, and have, except for the taxes which are the
subject of this action, paid all taxes so assessed.
3.

From May, 1973, and continuing throughout the

course of our dealings with the Josephsons with regard to the
property they purchased under contract from my parents, the water
assessments have been assessed against a total block of water
stock held in the Covington name, and the Josephsons have been
responsible for payment of their pro rata share.

The Josephsons

have never objected to that treatment, and have, except for the
assessments which are the subject of this action, paid all sums
so assessed.
4.

On May 8, 1992, I paid the taxes due and owing on

the property described in the tax notices attached to this
Affidavit as Exhibit "A" in the amount of $3,377.15 and water
assessments due and owing in the amount of $63.55.

These amounts

were due with respect to the Josephsons' property and water
stock.
-2-

5.

This payment was made to Superior Title Company,

in connection with the sale of our remaining property which was
adjacent to the real property purchased by the Josephsons in the
contract described in the Complaint in this matter.

Superior

Title Company forwarded the tax payment to the Salt Lake County
Treasurers's office, and obtained the receipts attached hereto as
Exhibit "B".
6.

We were required by Superior Title Company and by

the Salt Lake County Treasurer's office to pay the property taxes
on both our parcel and the Josephson's parcel because the parcels
had been assessed jointly by Salt Lake County, and unless all
taxes were paid we would not have been able to deliver clear
title to our purchasers.
7.

Although unknown to me and to the other co-

personal representative of the estate of Douglas Covington, the
Josephsons were part of the group which purchased our property in
the sale mentioned above.

The Josephsons did not at the time nor

have they since objected to our payment of the taxes on their
property.
8.

During the trial before Judge Moffat regarding the

right-of-way claimed by the Josephsons across our property, Mr.
Cummings, their attorney, represented to us and to the court that
the Josephsons would pay any taxes and water assessments which
-3-

were due on their parcel, as they had previously paid since 1973
throughout the course of our contract with them.
9.

Despite repeated assurances from the Josephsons

and their counsel that reimbursement for the taxes would be
forthcoming, I have not been reimbursed for the payment of the
property taxes or the water assessments.
10.

I have reviewed the statement from Draper Bank

which was attached to the affidavit of John C. Josephson and
dated October 16, 1992.

Said statement shows payments of

principal and interest only, and does not show payment of taxes,
since taxes were never paid through the Draper Bank escrow but
were paid to my father or to his estate directly.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT
DATED this

<JJ

day of December, 1992.
Mary C^wietman

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this r-^Z

day of

December, 1992.

Notary Public
!
CHRISTINE STAPLEY I
175 Enst 400 South <&00 I
Salt LafcoC^Uteh 84111 I

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake County/ Utah
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

.. .

I hereby certify that, on the c>^/ day of December,
1992, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Mary C. Whetman to
the following:
Gordon Madsen, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
1130 West Center Street
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
and telecopied a copy to him at 298-9460.

5ft^£/
5158F

?£

II

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broaabent (0442)
Sally B. McMinimee (5316)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

civil NO..

Judge

mm3335C\f

^/id^y^ry//^^

Defendants.

The Estate of Douglas B. Covington, by and through its
Personal Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C.
Whetman (hereafter "plaintiffs), hereby complain against the
defendants and allege as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Jurisdiction in this Court arises under Utah Code

Ann. § 78-3-4.
INCH, YEATES
QELOZAHLER
Centre I, Suite 900
ast Fourth South j
ait Lake City
j
Utah 84111
I
101)524-1000

EXHIBIT "C"

2.

Venn*,

i

M11 '' " u a n t

MM if"

to

dtan

>\jde

Ann.

§ 7 8-13-1.
PARTIES
3.
Whetman

Pi M U M M t

i'i»] i i i i

i Million

are Personal Representatives

and Mary C,

tor tne Estate ol; ijouyldo

B. C o v i n g t o n .
4.
husband

DcMlenaant • .inln

il CIT"M 1 dine d„ Josephson are

and wife and are residents oi Luxt Lake
FACTUAL
tni:j ' •

County,

BACKGROUND

i iii, .

ii i i :?ht-of-way

across

plaintiffs ' property.
r

",-OJiVevtMj
the

.

'II

On October
I'M-'UM i dL

following

2 7 r 2953, Alice Hansen

!'i , I'uVMiMifi ii I'm'

described

real

iV'ice

property

Covington

Hansen

located

in

Covinqton,
bait

judKf

County:
neyi..:. .. - t ^ ^ , n ^ v- -^ w ^ ^ w. -.. an« - ^ -. M.
• et
Bast from the Southwest corner c: the
Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter
of Section 3 5 , Townsnip 2, S o u t h , Range 1
B a s t , Salt LaKe M e r i d i a n , and . ur.r.ir.g thence
Soutn ^0°15 f East 8 6 3 . -•-•:; tnence South
69°15 f Bast 82.5 feet; t:.^::ce North 0°38'
;
West 615 .2 feet; thence West 3-1 feet
he
place JZ beginning.
Said r^nperty
'ur l y i rid

. .

is sometimes

re:-J: red t

herein

as

the

6.

In April of 1973, Douglas B. and Alice K.

Covington (the "Covingtons"), entered into an option agreement
with John and Geraldine Josephson (the "Josephsons") with
regard to a portion of the Original Parcel.

The option

agreement is attached as Exhibit "A" and is referred to
hereafter as the "Option".
7.

Pursuant to the terms of the Option, the

Covingtons and the Josephsons entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract (the "UREC") dated May 4, 1973.

The UREC is

attached as Exhibit "B".
8.

Under the terms of the UREC, the Covingtons

agreed to sell and the Josephsons agreed to buy the property
described as follows:
BEG, at a point N 89°54f10" W 1320 ft fr the
SE cor of Sec 35, T2S, R1E, SLB&M and
running th N 0°10,23" W 505.475 ft to a
point on an old barbed wire fenceline;
thence N 86°34,10" W 265.41 ft; th S 20°15'
E 555.567 ft to the S line of said Sec 35;
th along said S line S 89°54,10" E 74.17 ft
to point of beg.
9.

At the time the UREC was executed/r the Covingtons

executed a Warranty Deed conveying the above-described property
to the Josephsons and delivered the Deed into escrow pending
completion of the Josephesons1 obligations under the UREC.
copy of the Warranty Deed is attached as Exhibit "C".
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document is attached as ExniDit
11.

n

b

m

.:-**.-;.

- copy

n

signed

f t^is

,
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and

upon her death, all oi nei interest passed Lo Douglas h,
Douglas fa. Covington died on September &"!,

Covington.

Plaintiffs a: =? t\ ::e > ; J IH-I i^pr^snnf

i r »j

m

MM-* Pstate of

Douglas B. Covington.
12.
p i a i n t i t L .

i

On Decemher 2, 1988, at the request of
j i i i 111 J J l

, *

11 M

u i 111

,. , 11

i

ii i i i i

i

, 11 i 111

J o s e p h s o n r e g a r d i n g h i s u s e of t h e c l a i m e d r i g h t - o f - w a y a n a
notifyinq

h i m thrit h i s p e r m i s s i o n t o u s e t n e c l a i m e d

r ight-oi-w«jy

w a - I i f in u.iM.ii

i|

m

im

r>t i "

i

itiachei

as Exhibit " 1/ ,

IJ.

On December 15, 1988/ Jonn C. and Geraldine C.

J o s e p f j M 'in » , M in i i 11 ,i\ II i i I-M' i > i 11* M i i i ii n i i i M I T n i ti i er. t i i i he
o f f i c e of t h e Sail Lake County R e c o r d e r .

JII L I I I J

Notice, the

J o s e p h s o n s c l a i m .;i i i g h ^ - o f - w a y o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y o w n e d b y t h e
i u v i ii u .' MI i. u i u tc:

•RINCE, YEATES
V QELD2AHLER
r Centre I, Suite 900
i East Fourth South
Salt lake City
Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000

in

I ii i I • i ! i

i T ,n 'In 11 .] r , [' MI i n i t

r ' .

14.

In March of 1989, plaintiffs opbserved that the

Josephsons were traversing the plaintiffs1 property to gain
access to a portion of the Josephsons1 property and erected a
fence across their property to stop the Josephsons from
trespassing.
15.

On information and belief, the Josephsons removed

the fence and continued to traverse the plaintiffs' property.
Plaintiffs erected the fence a second time and, on information
and belief, the Josephsons again removed the fence for the
purpose of traversing plaintiffs1 property.
FIRST CLAIK FOR RELIEF
(Quiet Title and Declaratory Judgment)
16.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1

through 15.
17.

Since 1953, plaintiffs or their predecessors in

interest have been and continue to be the owners in fee of the
following property:
Beginning at a Point which is NORTH
89°54f10n WEST 1320.00 feet and NORTH
00°10f23" WEST 505.475 feet from the
Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; and running thence NORTH 86o34'10"
WEST along an existing fence line 265.41
feet; thence NORTH 20 o 15 l 00 B WEST 312.53
feet; thence SOUTH 89°54f19" EAST 372.18
feet; thence SOUTH 00°10'23" EAST 308.48
feet to the Point of Beginning. Contains
2.190 Acres.
UNCE, YEATES
GELDZAHLER
Centre I, Suite 900
East Fourth South
Salt Lake City
Utah 84111
801)524-1000
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18.

D ef e n d a n t s c J a iroa n i n te r e st i i i t h e

above-described property :i i: 1 the form of ai i alleged

right-of-way

across the property.
19 .

f|

I"

w i t h o u t any riyhl

i in * ' TI en n 1i "

1 II in i

' 111

w h a t e v e r and aefe.'ijc;,.

r i g h t , t i t l e , l i e n or i n t e r e s t , in __ „

11 r i i ' "t p r n p p n ' [ -

, uve nu e s t a t e ,
m e p r o p e r t y ot a n y

p a r t ti lerec £
20,

D e f e n d a n t s ' c l a i m c o n s t i t u t e s a c l o u d on

plaintiffs' title to the property.
23

Pursuant

ir J

n>

L

u ,

-. ,

I e_t seq. ai nd

§ 7 8 - 4 0 - 1 , et s e q . ( 1 9 5 3 , a s a m e n d e d ) , p l a i n t i f f s seek a
•judgment f r o m thin C o u r t q u i e t i n g tit.le in p l a i n t i f f s a n d
d e c l a r i n g that d e f e n d a n t s h a w im en T »du ,, l i y U

(

i n t e r e s t in or tn L h e i eal p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d

in p a r a g r a p h 1/'

Ljf I »', I J '• * n; ''i:

o f t 1: i i s C o m p J a i n 1, and t h a t plaintiffs are e n t i t 1 e d t o t h e
q u i e t , lawf u. 1, and peaceful possess!on of suc 1: :i p r o i »er t:;; SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Slander of Title)
reaj ] ege ai id :i r

-1

through 2 1 .
i.1 1 , D e f e n d a n t s

k n p w r>i h a d r e a s o n t o k n o w t h a t t h e

N o t i c e o r I n t e r e s t w i n U J U P . " I L i v i i U<' , i

PRINCE, YEATES
& GELDZAHLER
y Cantrt 1, Suite 900
j East Fourth South
Salt Lake City
Utah 84111

-6-

ni hi

attached as Exhibit "F", contains a material misstatement or
false claim, namely the claim of a right-of-way.
24.

On February 15, 1989, plaintiffs mailed a letter

to defendants1 attorney demanding that defendants reiease the
Notice of Interest insofar as it claimed a right-of-way.

A

copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit "G" and incorporated
herein by this reference.
25.

Defendants refuse to release the portion of the

Notice of Interest that relates to the alleged right-of-way and
the recorded Notice continues to cloud title to the property.
26.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (1953, as

amended), defendants are liable to plaintiffs for $1,000 or for
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable
attorneyfs fees and costs for refusing to release the Notice of
Interest.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass)
27.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1

through 26.
28.

Defendants1 actions in removing the fence built

on the plaintiffs1 property and continued use of plaintiffs'
property for passage constitute trespass on plaintiffs1
property.
INCE. YEATES
QELOZAHLER
Centra I, Suit* 900
MSX Fourth South
Alt UK* City
Utah 84111

-7-

29.

A s t h e direct and p r o x i m a t e result of d e f e n d a n t s 1

a c t i o n s , p l a i n t i f f s have been damaged and seek r e c o v e r y of an
an 10ui it t' : i: - 5 • :a 2t EM:I i i

t tria]

F O U R T H CAUSE OF A C T I O N
(Injunctive
30.

Relief)

P J c , :i i 11: :i f £ s r e a ] 1 e g e a :i: d :i n c : o r p o r a t e p a r a g r a p h s ]

:erer.car.:s

?v cerenaa'
d e m o n s t . «*. .
c z n ti i n u e u s i r. •

j t L- r i v : r, a

P-iaintnis of
32^ I . t-'ClaL-.c

d e f e n d a n t s 1 u s e of t h e property i n t e r f e r e s w i t h p l a i n t i f f s 1 u s e
and title t o t h e p r o p e L i. y ,
33.

P l a i n t i f f s have n o a d e q u a t e remedy at l a w O T

o t h e r w i s e for f h p harm or damage done and t h r e a t e n e d to be done
by d e f e n d a n t
34.

I >* i , i u v I i u

t

ui[-

; i in 11 i 11

i

i | i i | u- r

A c c o r d i n g l y , p l a i n t i f f s seek an order o f this

C o u r t p e r p e t u a 1 ] y e n j o i n i n g and r e s t r a i n i n g d e f e n d a n t s ,
a g e n t s , atLoi. nt) , <iml

i I " £i*j L *™^ »I is c ] a:i :i i i:i i : g b v m

from t r e s p a s s i n g on p l a i n t i f f s * p r o p e r t y , or o t h e r w i s e

•RINCE, YEATES
L QELDZAHLER
f Centre 1, Suite 900
> Ernst Fourth South
Salt Lake City
Utah 84111
fftnn KOA.-innn

their
u i n l i i1 I I

in

interfering with the use and occupation of the land by
plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court grant the
following relief:
1.

On plaintiffs1 first cause of action, for a

decree from the Court declaring and adjudging that plaintiffs
own in fee simple and are entitled to the quiet and peaceful
possession of the property; and that defendants, and all
persons claiming under them, have no estate, right, title, lien
or interest in or to the real property or any part thereof.
2.

On plaintiffs1 second cause of action, that

pursuant to the § 38-9-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended)
plaintiff recover $1,000 or treble actual damages, whichever is
greater and for attorneys fees and costs.
3.

On plaintiffs1 third cause of action for damages

in an amount to be determined at trial.
4.

On plaintiffs1 fourth cause of action, for the

Court to issue a permanent injunction restraining and enjoining
defendants from using the plaintiffs1 real property, or in any
manner interfering with the use and occupation of said real
property by the plaintiffs.
5.

On all causes of action, that plaintiffs recover

attorney's fees and costs of this action.

*CE, YEATES
ELDZAHLER
. -itre I, Suite 900
:*st Fourth South
>att Lake City
Utah 84111
301)524-1000
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6.

F o i ::; u c I i o 11 i e r a i i ci f i 1 r t I: :i € • r i: e 1 i e f a s t i 1 :i s C o u r t

may deem p r o p e r a n d e q u i t a b l e .
DATED t n i s

& b " ^ ri a " ~- f M a y , 1 9 8 9 .
FK^JCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

David K. Broadbentf
Attorneys for P1aInt if f
Plaintiffs1 Address
941 Statice Avenue
Sandy, Utah 84070
0371n

•WMCE, I'EATES
ft QELDZAHLER
y Centra I, Suite 900
> East Fourth South
Salt Lake City
Utah 84111
(801) 524'1000

OPTION
In consideration of JI
and
Optionor

, grant

to_JLC£

and,

S

Optionee—, the option to purchase the hereinafter described property for the purchase price of %JL&£!£Cu2tf 6
to be exercised by giving written notice thereof to Optioner at..
, County of
s
..State of . 1 2 1
_, at any time on or before.
^Sr-

u notice thereof,.
19 7J , at
/J
o'clock JZ_. M. If this Opt ion is exercised, then after receiving: written
Optionor— will furnish Optionee— with an abstract of title brought up to the date of exercise *f the Option or
a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price and, upon payment of the purchase price due
will deliver to Optionee_ a good and s u f f i c i e n t — / i - r ^ - 4 deed conveying marketable fee simple
title to the hereinafter described property, free and clear ot all encumbrances except as herein mentioned. The .
consideration paid for this Option aha'l
be credited on the purchase price
DESCRIPTION OF PROPER'

1

-yff^L

ENCUMBRANCES

_________f^~^
'sJv%>,

STATE OF.
BS.

COUNTY OF.
On the

.day of.

-, 19

, personally appeared before
and.
-, the
me.
signers of the above and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same*
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

• LANK N O . 1 1 * — © CCM PTO. CO — 3213 £ 0 2 6 0 0 LAST — SALT LAK£ CITY

Residing at.

pyuf&pftfFF

"THIS !S A IfGALlY I ' N D I N G C D N T * A "

». N c * JNOE*S*OOC, Set* C O M T T I K * >nv!C».'

:::.._ ESTATE CONTRA C

UNIFORM

L THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this

4 T

*

day of

*I2

L^_^

A. D. 18

by -snd between
*
—
,—
— •'
be.einafter oesignated as the Seller, and
JO JiJ C . J .'. ^ l - r
»M; C ' f i » U . . r C. JOS' f . i ^ r r . ,
_
i s w i f ' „ f •»« -iru t e n **rv* n o t a ? T«n i n c c r . n c ; - f w i t h f u l l ri', i:lfr o f s u r v i v o r s h i p s hereinafter designated »* the Buyer, of

kfiXl

l.a^Cw i t v t

.2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, fo? trie consideration herein mentioned agreei to seli snd convey u> the buyer,
and the buyer lor tne consiaeration herein mentioned agrees to purcnase the following describee real property, situate in
the countr ©f

Sgjt

L*kf>

__., Stat* of Utah, to-m-it; .

,

,

.

ADDRUI

More particularly described as follow*
t Cr » t a P o i n t N 8 9 ° 5 4 , i ,
- ^ _~ . : i . v i e ~
of i>*»c J S , * ;.-! ; f f-'i^'.-r- arc! r u t r.irv
t r N ? c : ^ r r ? " v. 5 a J , 4 7 5 I t v c a p o i n t oi &r o i c D*~rbe*d
v , i r - f f . r i C ? . l i n & ; t h : ;-.c* " r ' c — — •• : - f s . 4 l i t ; it. L .C< i . ' ...M" ft
t o t i ' o .ij, l i n e o f F M ; r - - c ?~ ;
*i^r*~
fchj.o^'liii
r* ,- .
t o p o i n t c ' b'.*f .
5
-»•;£ • i• • •• • •"I !"?: x, « h » r r « o f ^ a r vv :i 3 1 c m 11 r i r : a c:a oi > •»' i • r m i : : •' • •

3. Said Buver hereby screes to enter into possession and p*y for said described premises the sum of

;

_

-)
M
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or oroer
' * r"- ""
" ' Aljl' ^ h - .tnctly * t h » the foUnrmc tinm. t*-*it: " ' ' T . - ^ J S , - . ^ -V - H C / 1 0 C

cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and 'the balance of *

f

t

——.
(

, 3,000.^0

,

*,n*11 *** p a i d * s J o l ' o w i :

T*

SlL)7,U'v! or rorc P?T nontn cosncncinr Juno 10, 1973 end montr.Iy thrrcftiter
utktil pTinci:»l balance top other *ith accrued i n t c t e s i has. neen paid in full*
Any payront t:, i t b r c c r «f 1 S da y F O r n a r * r1 r» 1 i n c u <? n t 6 h a 11 h«? c h t . r o c ri a $ 5 , 0 0
p »-• r r. r. r. t h 1 * t v c h a r r. t ,
'• T • I ^ v i n r t o n ? l . o 11 r v t r i n u ? < o 1" 1 1 c; r * o r D r c p ^ r t y

f o r a w : : i«""' u of 11 ) y « r s .

" u w r .if f ' ^ s t o n o t h o l e » e l l < ? r l i a r . l c f o r r n v f u t u r e p r o o l e m i ; c r l i t i f * t i r . n
w i t ! ; r e r a n ' t o i^runr'ary l i n e
rtipcrepancy
b c t r p r n s u r v e y a r d e x i r t : nr f p n e e l i n o
S e l l e r a r r c - ' S t o a s t i f t b u y e r i n a n y w a y p o s s i b l e - t o r p . s o l v f proi.-lu..,.
Possession of said premises shall 'be delivered to buyer on the

4 tL

osy of

ii£i!

L-__Li__1 19— —

4. Said monthly payments are to 'be applied first to the psyment of interest and second to the reduction of tne
principal. Interest shall be charged from

:bl£"' 7 '~

,

on all unpaid portion* of ti »

purchase price a t the rate of
E
Tc) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime,
p e r cent («___§
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortnurc
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied eitner to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time, the excess payment u made.
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so d o m e it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of ,___—,,________-_—norip
with an unpaid balance of
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvement* 'to said premises now in the proct^s of being installed, or which .have been completed and no: paid for, outstanding against said property, except the iollom-ing
nnrtr——
,
.
__—
.
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed tht
then unpaid 'Contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not 'to exceed
§.
_
percent
(
**) p€T annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrreg*te monthly installment
payment* required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. Wr*n the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and mortgage* the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees t o accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of aaid prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said property wcumd
by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unitn
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable Under l o r a loan oi such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of aaid lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-naif the expenses necessary in obtaining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-naif, provided however, that the -monthly payments and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The B u y e r agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which m a y become due on these premises during the life of this acrreement The Seller hereby covenanu and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

none
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property.

12 The Buyer agree* to par the general U i « after

5-4*73

IS. The Buyer furthe- agrees to keep all insurable building* and improvements oc said premises insured m a <
P*J»y acceptable to the Sailer m the amount of not lee* than the unpaid balance on this contract, or l_ n / i
and to assign aa*d meuranee to the Seller aa his interests nar appear and to deliver Use insurance policy to him.
U In the event the Buyer shall oeiauh in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessment* or insurance
premiums as herein provided,, the Selier may ax his option pav said taxes assessments and insurance premiums or eitneT
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buver agrees to repay tne Seller upon demand *U tuch sums so advanced
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from oate of payment oi said sums at the rate of V of one percent per
month unti. paid
16 Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committee any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in rood condition
16. In the event of s failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failurt of the Buyer to make
. cays thereafter, the
any payment or payments when the same shall become due. or within
20.
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice,
to be released froir all obligation* in law and in equity to convey said property and all pa> menu which have
been made theretofore on tnis contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the contract, and tht Buyer agree* that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take
posses* tor of said premises without legal processes as in its f i l l and former estate torvther with sll improvements end additions made by the Buyer thereon and the said addition* and improvement* shall remain with
B

the land N f o m t th« property of the Seller the Buyer becoming at enee • U M n i at will «f tn« Kri»«r, *r
The Seller m*y bnng »uil and recover judjrment for all delinquent i m u l i m t r i u including coat* and attorney*
fee* (The use of thi* remeoy on one or more occasion* shall not prevent the Seller, al hu option, from resorting
to one of the other rentedie* hereunder in the event of a subsequent default) or

C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the enure unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and ma* eiect to treat thia contract a* a note and mortgage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, a no proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the law* of
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceed* applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney* fees, and the Seller ms\ have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, tne Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged propert) and collect the rent*, issue* and
profit* therefrom and appl> the aame to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant
to order of the court, and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure shall be entitled to the possession
of the aaid pr^mi»e» during the period of redemption
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
18 In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premise* other than those herein provided for or
referred to or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for ahall hereafter accrue against the
aame by acu or nefloet of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, nay *nd discharge the »*me and receive credit
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any sucr. payment or payment* *nd thereafter the paymenu herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aioreaaid.
19. The Seller on receiving the payment* herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manne* *hove mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns., a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title Xt> the
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
bv or through the acts or neglect of the Buver, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of titie insurance in the amount
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at anj time during the
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buver.
20 h is hereby expresalj understood and agreed br the parties her< to that the Buver accept* tht said property
in its present conditior and that there art no representations, covenants, or agreements hetween tht parues hereto uith
reference to aaid property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto _
nor>o
21. The Buyer ^nd Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreement* contained herein, that the defaulting P*«y shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attomev's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the nremises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedj t* pursued bj filing a suit
or otherwise.
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrator*, successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
~lHvWITNESS WHEREOF, the aaid parties to this agreement have hereunto signed! their names, the day and year
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Signed In the presence of
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STATE OF 'UTAH,
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Salt
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AI.TCF. HANSEN COVINGTON, h i s w i f e
the signer s of the above instrument, who duly akkn^f ledgex) t& nxe that ^ ^ y executed, 'the
same.
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My commission expires
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December 2 ,

1988

TELECO^IC*
(soi) 5^A•lOfrs

Mr. John C. Josephson
8560 South Danish Road
Sandy, Utah 84070
Dear Mr. Josephson:
This firm repre sents the e state of Douglas B.
Covington. In connectio n with our representation of this
estate we have obtained a survey of the estate's property on
Danish Road and have met with repre sentatives of the estate to
discuss the history of i ts property
We understand that you
have been using a portio n of the Covington property along its
south border to obtain a ccess to pr operty you own. he also
understand that you have sufficient property along Danish Road
to provide whatever acce ss you may need without using the
Covington property.
Accordingly, you are hereby notified that your
permission to traverse the Covington property is terminated and
that at the expiration of thirty days following the date of
this letter the Covington estate will place a barrier across
the portion you have been using.
Very truly yours,

David K. Broa'dbent
DKB/cs
7062b

£*%,T ^ r ^

6? r** j j

NOTICE OF INTEREST
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON and GERALD I r«M: C. JOSEPHSON, his wife,
hereby give notice that they claim an interest in and to the
following-described tract (Tract 1) by virtue of a Uniform Real
Estate Contract dated May 4, 1973, wr.erein Douglas B. Covington
and Alice H. Covington appear as sellers and John C. Josephson and
Geraldine C. Joncphson appear as buycrsr which contract covers the
following tract (Tract 1) and is situate in Salt Lake County,
Utah, to-wit:
TRACT 1: "Beginning at a point North 89° 54 1 10" West
1320 feet' from the Southeast corner of Section 35,
Township 2 South, Ranqe 1 East, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian, and running thence North U° 10f 23 M West
505.475 feet to a point on an old barbed wire fenceline;
thence North 36° 34' 10" West 265.41 feet; thence South
2CC 15 1 555.567 feet to the South line of said Section
35; thence along said South line South 89° 54" 10" East
74.17 feet to point of beginning.
Together with 5 shares of Big Willow Irrigation water
stock.
The following-described tract (TRACT 2) situate in Salt
Lake County, Utah, being a part of the foregoing description, has
.heretofore been deeded by the said Douglas B. Covington and Alice
H. Covington to the undersigned, to-wit:
TRACT 2: Beqinning at a point North 89° 54' 10" West
1320.0 feet and North 0° 10' 23" West ZQ2.Q feet from
the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running
thence North 0° 10 ! 23" West 130.0 feet; thence South 89°
54' 10" West 176.2 feet to a fence line; thence South
19° 56' East along said fence line 138.28 feet; thence
South 89° 541 10" East 129.06 feet to the point of
beginning.

The undersigned also claim a right-of-way for ingress to
and egress from the foregoing tracts over a tract (TRACT 3)
adjacent on the north by virtue of an Option agreement granted to
the undersigned by the said Douglas B. Covington and Alice H.
Covington dated April 6, 1973. The property (Tract 3) over which
said right of way (which right of way is south of Covington Drive
Way) is claimed is situate in Salt Lake County, Utah, and
described as follows:
TRACT 3: Commencing North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 feet and
North 0° 10' 23" West 505.475 feet from the Southeast
corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian, and runnina thence North 0°
10' 23" West 309.725 feet; thence North 89° 44' West 381
feet; thence South 20° 15' Easr. 303.333 feet, more or
less (to a point North 86 o 34 ! 10" Went 265.41 feet from
the point of beginning); unence South 86° 34' 10" East
265.41 feet to the place of beginning.
DATED this

tf

day cf December, 1988.

GERALDINE C. JOSE^fiSON1/

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF FALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
[^

day of December, 198B, by JOHN C. JOSEPHSON and GERALDINE

C. JOSEPHSON, tr>e signers of the foregoinq instrument.

/1&* t?> £u
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires;
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February 15, 1989

M. DAVID C C K C » S L C T

DON «. ftCHOw
ftALL* tUCK M«H«NIMCE
JOHN t . HOLDC»*t

Robert C. Cummings, Esq.
225 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Right-of-Way Dispute between the Estate of
Douglas B. Covington and John C. and Geraldine C.
Josephson

Dear Mr. Cummings:
As you are aware, this firm represents the estate of
Douglas B. Covington in connection with the above-referenced
matter. I am in receipt of your letter dated December 16,
1988, in which you assert a right-of-way on behalf of John C.
and Geraldine C. Josephson over the property of my client and
under which you enclosed a Notice of Interest which, among
other things, asserts your clients claim to such right-of-way.
I have discussed this alleged right-of-way in detail
with my client. After careful consideration of all of your
client's assertions, it is my client's position that no legal
right-of-way was granted nor does it now exist.
Accordingly, I hereby demand on behalf of my client
that your client release that portion of the subject Notice of
Interest that relates to the alleged right-of-way.
If your client's fail to do so within ten days of your
receipt of this letter, I have been instructed to commence
legal action against your client to protect my client's
interest in the subject property.
Very truly yours,
>~j?L
David K. Broadbent
DKB:jc
cc: Mr. Robert Covington
Ms. Mary Whetman
5274L

RECEIVED
JUN221989

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777
Attorney for the Defendants
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 322-1141
6G
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
III AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.,
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Wheaton,
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
Plaintiff,
Civil No. C-89-3339

vs.
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.
Come now the defendants and answer plaintiff's Complaint
as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Said Complaint fails to state a claim against

defendants upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
2.

Admit the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

3.

Admit the allegations of paragraph 7 and 8f except

and 6.

allege that the document attached hereto as Exhibit C was executed
concurrently with the Uniform Real Estate Contract (copy of which

EXHIBIT " 0 "

is annexed hereto as Exhibit B),and as a part thereof, and by the
terms of said instruments (Exhibits A and B hereto) the right-ofway described in the Option Agreement was a part of the said
Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Also the said contract covered five

shares of Big Willow Irrigation Water Stock.

Except as admitted

heretin, the allegations of said paragraphs 7 and 8 are denied.
4.

Answering paragraph 9, admit that a Warranty Deed

was placed in escrow, and otherwise deny the allegations of said
paragraph 9.
5.

Answering paragraph 10, the defendants acknowledge

that the said document attached to plaintiff's Complaint as
Exhibit D (wnich is attacned to this Answer and Counterclaim as
Exhibit C) was executed, allege that the same is a part of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract, and allege that pursuant thereto the
legal description of the right-of-way was to be determined by
survey and included by metes and bounds in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract and in the aforesaid Warranty Deed, and allege that said
Exhibit D to plaintiff's Complaint was executed on behalf of all
sellers and buyers and was executed at the closing, and otherwise
deny the allegations of paragraph 10.
6.

Admit the allegations of paragraph 11.

7.

Answering paragraph 12, admit that defendants sent

the letter dated December 2, 1988, copy of which is attached to
plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit E, and admit that the same was
sent at the request of plaintiff, deny that plaintiff had any
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right to terminate said right-of-way, and otherwise deny the
allegations thereof.
8.

Admit the allegations of paragraph 13.

9.

Answering paragraph 14, admit that the plaintiff

attempted to interfere with defendants1 right-of-way into the
property by erecting a fence, and otherwise deny the allegations
of paragraph 14.
10.

Answering paragraph 15, defendants admit that they

prudently and without any breach of the peace removed all
obstructions placed on their right-of-way and that they have
continued to use the said right-of-way, and deny each and every
other allegation of paragraph 15.
11.

Answering paragraph 16, defendants adopt as their

answer thereto their answers as hereinabove set forth to the
paragraphs referred to therein.
12.

Answerinq paragraph 17, admit that plaintiff is the

owner of said property subject to the right-of-way of defendants
to cross said property from Danish Road to gain access to
defendants1 property (located adjacent to the plaintiff on the
south) at a location approximately 150' west of Danish Road, and
otherwise deny the allegations of said paragraph 17.
13.

Admit the allegations of paragraph 18.

14.

Deny the allegations of paragraphs 19, 20 and 21.

-3-

15.

Answering paragraph 22, defendants adopt as their

answer thereto their answers as hereinabove set forth to the
paragraphs referred to therein.
16.

Deny the allegations of paragraph 23.

17.

Answering paragraph 24, admit that plaintiff's

counsel sent Exhibit G, and otherwise deny the allegations of
paragraph 24.
18.

Answering paragraph 25, defendants admit that they

claim the right-of-way as granted to them under the Option and
Uniform Real Estate Contract, that they have refused to release
the same, and allege their entitlement to said right-of-way, and
otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 25.
19.

Deny the allegations of paragraph 26 and allege

said instrument is valid and accurate and was recorded in good
faith.
20.

Answering paragraph 27, defendants adopt as their

answer thereto their answers as hereinabove set forth to the
paragraphs referred to therein.
21.

Deny the allegations of paragraphs 28 and 29.

22.

Answering paragraph 30, defendants adopt as their

answer thereto their answers as hereinabove set forth to the
paragraphs referred to therein.
23.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 30,

31, 32, 33 and 34.

-4-

24.

Deny each and every allegation of said Complaint

not hereinabove specifically admitted.
THIRD DEFENSE
25.

Defendants have paid all amounts owing under the

said Uniform Real Estate Contract and are entitled to conveyance
of the tract described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the
right-of-way referred to in the said Option and in the two
documents constituting the said Uniform Real Estate Contract
(Exhibits A and B hereto), and plaintiff has wrongfully refused to
make conveyance thereof.

Plaintiff's claims are without merit and

are not asserted in good faith, and defendants are entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code
Annotated.

By reason of the foregoing plaintiff is barred and

estopped from asserting its claims, and defendants are entitled to
relief as set forth in their Counterclaim, which is incorporated
as an additional affirmative defense at this point.

COUNTERCLAIM
As a Counterclaim against plaintiffs (hereafter referred
to collectively as "plaintiff") defendants allege as follows:
1.

On or about April 6, 1973, defendants and

plaintiff's predecessors, Douglas B. and Alice H. Covington,
entered into an Option Agreement, copy of which is annexed hereto
as Exhibit A.
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2.

In addition to granting defendants the right to

acquire the principal tract of land of approximately two acres in
size and five shares of water stock, the said Option granted a
right-of-way to said tract across the property of said Douglas B.
and Alice H. Covington from Danish Road to the north side of the
property being purchased by defendants, entering that property at
a point approximately 150' west of Danish Road, in the following
language:
"There will be an access R/W conveyed which is to
be described just south of Covington Drive/Way."
Defendants exercised the Option, and a Uniform Real Estate
Contract was entered into consisting of two documents, copies of
which are annexed hereto as Exhibits B and C.
3.

By virtue of the foregoing, defendants were

entitled to a conveyance from plaintiff's predecessors of the
principal tract, described in the said Uniform Real Estate
Contract, together with five shares of Big Willow Irrigation,
together with a right-of-way across plaintiff's predecssor's
property "from Danish Road to the north side of defendants1
property."
4.

At the time the said Option was entered into and

the said Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered into, a right-ofway existed from Danish Road across the property retained by the
plaintiff and into the north side of the property sold by
plaintiff's predecessors to the defendants.

The said right-of-way

was used for many years by the said Douglas B. and Alice H.
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Covington to access mink pens and outbuildings located on the
property purchased by defendants.

This right-of-way is

hereinafter referred to as the "Existing Right-of-Way."

Tne

defendants have used the existing right-of-way with the consent of
plaintiff!s predecessors, Douglas B. and Alice H. Covington, from
1973 until the present time.

Such use was without objection

whatsoever until the plaintiff attempted to interfere therewith in
December 1988.
5.

Defendants are entitled to a conveyance from

plaintiff by warranty deed as provided in the said Uniform Real
Estate Contract to the tract of land described therein, together
with five shares of water stock, together with the existing rightof-way to and from the aforesaid tract across the followingdescribed tract of plaintiff's land located in Salt Lake Couty,
Utah, to-wit:
Commencing North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 feet and North
0° 10f 23" West 505.475 feet from the Southeast corner
of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Base & Meridian, and running thence North 0° 10f 23"
West 309.725 feet; thence North 89° 441 West 381 feet;
thence South 20° 15 1 East 303.333 feet, more or less (to
a point North 86°34,10" West 265.41 feet from the point
of beginning); thence South 86° 341 10" East 265.41 feet
to the place of beginning.
The existing right-of-way is approximately 15 feet wide and the
center line thereof commences approximately 15 to 20 feet north of
the boundary line between the parties and enters the property of
the defendants approximately 150 feet west of Danish Road.

The

said right-of-way is clearly defined, having been used in excess
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of 17 years, and is subject to being surveyed and described by
metes and bounds description.

Defendants allege that the parties

intended, in executing the Option and the two documents that
constitute the Uniform Real Estate Contract, that defendants have
the existing right-of-way as access to the tract being purchased
by defendants and that the same be included in the Uniform Real
Estate Contract and warranty deed and that it be included with a
metes and bounds description.
6.

The said Uniform Real Estate Contract has been

fully paid and performed by defendants, and defendants are
entitled to conveyance as set out in paragraph 5 of this
Counterclaim.
7.

The plaintiffs refusal to so convey is without

merit and not asserted in good faith, and defendants are entitled
to all damages sustained by them as proved at trial, including
reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section 78-27-56.

Para-

graph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract also provides for the
award of reasonable attorney's fees in enforcing said contract as
may be proved at the time of trial.
8.

The plaintiff has attempted on several occasions

during the period between December 1988 and commencement of this
action to obstruct the said right-of-way by erecting a fence
across the same to prevent defendants from using the same.
9.

The plaintiff threatens to obstruct the same in
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the future, and plaintiff will commit and continue to commit the
unlawful act of attempting to obstruct said right-of-way unless
restrained in violation of defendants1 rights.
10.

Such an obstruction of said right-of-way will

result in great and irreparable injury to defendants.
11.

By reason of such unlawful obstruction of said

right-of-way, defendants have been damaged in the sum of $2,500.
12.

Such act of objstruction was malicious, wilful and

intentional, and defendants are entitled to punitive damages in
the sum of $10,000.
13.

Defendants have no adequate remedy at law, or

otherwise, for the damage threatened to be done by plaintiff
because damages will not compensate them for the loss of use of
the easement for said purposes.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
As their Second Cause of Action against plaintiff the
defendants allege as follows:
14.

Defendants adopt the allegations of their First

Cause of Action.
15.

DrfnndnntR nm

r>nj|ii»n \n

lorhritml Inn nf \r\\h HH\A

Uniform Real Estate Contract and deed to include therein the
provision granting to the defendants a right-of-way from Danish
Road to the north part of their property across the existing rightof-way and that the same be described by metes and bounds
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description, or in the alternative at a location mutually
convenient to the parties.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintifffs Complaint be
dismissed and that this court determine that defendants are the
owners in fee simple absolute of the property described in said
Real Estate Contract attached hereto as Exhibit B, together with
the five shares of Big Willow Irrigation Water Stock, together
with A tujM-ot-way across the property of plaintiff described in
paragraph 5 above extending from Danish Road at a point
approximately 20 feet north of the boundary line between the
parties to the north side of defendants1 property and enter the
same approximately 150 feet west of Danish Road, and that the
court adjudge the metes and bounds description of said right-ofway after survey thereof has been performed, and that plaintiff be
required to convey the foregoing by warranty deed, for reasonable
attorney's fees, costs and for such other relief as is just to be
granted, for damages in the sum of $2,500 plus damages for failure
to convey said right-of-way as maya be proved at trial, for
punitive damages in the sum of $10,000, and adjudging that
plaintiff be perpetually enjoined from interfering with
defendants1 use and occupancy of said right-of-way, and for such
other relief as is just to be granted in the premises.

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
~j?
Attorney for the Defendants

-10-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer and
Counterclaim was mailed to David K. Broadbent and Sally B.
McMinimee, attorneys for the plaintiff, at their address, 175 East
Fourth South, #900, Salt Lake City, Utah
this

*7/l

day of June, 1989.
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84111, postage prepaid,

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent (0442)
Sally B. McMinimee (5316)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS1
COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C-89-3339

vs.
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants,

The Estate of Douglas B. Covington, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C.
Whetman (hereafter "plaintiffs"), answer defendants1
Counterclaim as follows:

RINCE, YEATES
I QELDZAHLER
C«ntr* i, Suite 900
East Fourth South
Sttt U k t City
Utah 64111
(501) 524-1000

EXHIBIT ne*«
"E

FIRST DEFENSE
Defendants1 Counterclaim fails to state a claim
against plaintiffs upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
Responding to the specific allegations of defendants1
Counterclaim, plaintiffs respond as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations of paragraph 1

of defendants1 Counterclaim.
2.

Plaintiffs admit that the option agreement

(hereafter "Option") granted defendants the right to acquire
the principal tract of land plus five shares of water stock
(hereafter "the Property"), that the defendants exercised the
Option with respect to the Property, and that a Uniform Real
Estate Contract was entered into which covered the Property.
Plaintiffs deny all other allegations contained in paragraph 2
of defendants1 Counterclaim.
3.

Plaintiffs admit that upon performance of their

objections under the Uniform Real Estate Contract the
defendants should be entitled to a conveyance of the Property
described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract but, upon
information and belief, deny that defendants have performed
said obligations.

Plaintiffs further allege that they

delivered a deed to a portion of the Property to defendants and
tINCE, YEATE8
j
QELDZAHLER
I
^•ntrtl,Sult#900 |
East Fourth South
>att U k t City
Utth 84111
101) 524-1000

that they delivered a deed to the remaining portion into Escrow
-2-

as required by said contract.

Plaintiffs deny all other

allegations contained in paragraph 3 of defendants1
Counterclaim.
4.

Plaintiffs admit that the Covingtons used a path

to reach various parts of their property, but deny that the
Covingtons1 use of their property created a right-of-way in
favor of defendants, as alleged in paragraph 4 of defendants1
Counterclaim.

The plaintiffs deny any other allegations

contained in paragraph 4 of defendants' Counterclaim.
5.

Plaintiffs admit that upon performance of

defendants obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract
by defendants, defendants shall be entitled to the conveyance
referred to in paragraph 5(a) and (b) of defendants1
Counterclaim, but allege that the Covingtons discharged their
obligations to convey the Property to defendants by executing a
Warranty Deed on June 6, 1978 and delivering the deed into
escrow.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations of paragraph 5(c) of

defendants' Counterclaim.
6.

Plaintiffs are without information or belief as

to the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of defendants'
Counterclaim and, therefore, deny the same, and further allege
that the Covingtons' conveyed the Property to the defendants by
delivery of a Warranty Deed into Escrow at the time the Uniform
Real Estate Contract was executed.
•WNCE, YEATE8
I QEUKAHUEft
r Central, Suit* 900
> East Fourth South
Salt Ukt City
j
Utah 84111
j
(801) 524.1000
I
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7.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations of paragraph 7 of

defendants' Counterclaim.
8.

Plaintiffs admit that they have attempted to

obstruct defendants' continuing trespass onto their property by
constructing a fence across the property.

Plaintiffs deny all

other allegations of paragraph 8 of defendants' Counterclaim.
9.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 9 of

defendants' Counterclaim.
10.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 10

of defendants' Counterclaim.
11.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 11

of defendants' Counterclaim.
12.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 12

of defendants1 Counterclaim.
13.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 13

of defendants' Counterclaim.
14.

Plaintiffs incorporate their answers to

paragraphs 1 through 14 in answer to paragraph 14 of
defendants' Counterclaim.
15.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations of paragraph 15

of defendants1 Counterclaim.
THIRD DEFENSE
Defendants' claims against plaintiff are barred by the
Statute of Frauds.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Defendants1 claims against plaintiff are barred by the
Doctrine of Unclean Hands.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Defendants' claims against plaintiff are barred by a
lack of consideration.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Defendants' claims against plaintiffs are barred by
the Statute of Limitations.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request that this Court dismiss
witn prejudice defendants' Counterclaim against plaintiffs and
award plaintiffs their QO^ts of defense plus attorneys' fees.

fDATED this

day of July, 1989,
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

David K. Broadbent

Sally B1. McMinimee
Attorneys'for Plaintiffs
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the

day of July, 1989,

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM to the
WINCE, YEATES
I QELDZAHLEft
' O n t r t l , SulttSOO
East Fourth South
Salt Laka City
Utah 84111
(801)524-1000

following:
-5-

Robert C. Cummings
Attorney for Defendants
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah b4111

&L 'U^
0506n
071489

INCE. YEATE8
QELDZAHLEft
*ntrtl,Su»tt900
*tt Fourth South
*lt Ukt City
Utah 84111
U)1) 524-1000
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EXHIBIT "A"
ROBERT C. CUMKINGS, #777
Attorney for the Defendants
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 322-1141
6F
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.,
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. C-89-3339

vs.
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Judge Richard B. Moffat

Defendants.
The above-entitled action came on for trial on the
19th day of June, 1991, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
District Court Judge.

The plaintiffs appeared in person and

by and throuch their attorneys, David K. Broadbent and Sally
McMinixnee, and the defendants appeared in person and by and
through their attorney, Robert C. Cummings.

The Court heard the

opening arguments of counsel and the evidence presented during
plaintiffs1 case in chief, and the parties stipulated with regard
to certain testimony as set forth in the record, and the parties
having further stipulated that the matter of attorneys fees be
reserved for determination after the trial.

The defendants made a

EXHIBIT "F*

motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of the plaintiffs1 case in
chief, and the court determined that, based upon the facts and
law, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on their Complaint
and determined that defendants are entitled to the right-of-way as
hereinafter set forth, and the matter of attorney's fees having
been presented by affidavit and argument of counsel for the
parties conducted on October 25, 1991, and the Court, being
advised in the premises, and the Court, having heretofore made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED:
1.

The defendants and their heirs and assigns forever

are owners in fee simple of the following-described real property
in Salt Lake County, Utah:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54* 10" West 1320 feet
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, running
thence North 0° 10f 23" West 505.475 feet to a point on
an old barbed wire fence line; thence North 86° 34' 10"
West along an existing fence line 265.41 feet; thence
South 20° 15fEast 555.567 feet to the South line of said
Section 35; thence along said South line South 89° 54*
10" East 74.17 feet to the point of beginning.
Less the following-described tract:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54f 10" West 1374.47 feet
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence North 89° 54f 10" West 10.88 feet; thence
North 20° 15' West 155.99 feet to the Southeast corner
of Lot 12, Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence North 20°
15' West 317.95 feet to the Northeast corner of Lot 10,
Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence South 89° 421 07" East
12.03 feet to fence line; thence South 19° 56' East
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along fence line 316.93 feet? thence South 20° 30' East
along fence line 156.57 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with the following described tract:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54f 10" West 1320.00 feet
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2
Southr Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence North 89° 54 * 10" West 54.47 feet to
fence line; thence South 20° 30' East along fence line
6.41 feet to fence corner? thence South 89° 541 10" East
along fence line 52.24 feet? thence North 0° 10f 23"
West 6.00 feet ro the point of beginning.
Together with a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress
to and egress from the aforesaid tracts described in this
paragraph 1 of this Judgment over the following-described tract:
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 1320
feet and North 0° 10f 23" West 505.475 feet from the
Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North
86° 34' 10" West along an existing fence line 125 feet, more
or less, to the west boundry of existing entrance way to
defendants1 real property hereinabove described in this
paragraph 1 of this Judgment? thence North 0° 10 * 23" West 15
feet? thence South 86° 34f 10" East 125 feet, more or less,
to the Fast boundry of plaintiffs1 property described in
paragraph 3 below; thence South 0° 10f 23" East 15 feet to
the point of beginning.
If plaintiffs or their heirs or assigns forever elect to
maintain a locked gate across said right-of-way, a key
thereto will be furnished at all times by the party
maintaining said locked gate to defendants and their heirs,
and assigns forever.
2.

The defendants are owners of five (5) shares of Big

Willow Irrigation Company water stock, which have been delivered
to them.
3.

Plaintiffs and their heirs and assigns forever are

owners in fee simple of the following-described real property in
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Salt Lake County, Utah, subject only to the non-exclusive right-ofway referred to in paragraph 1 above:
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West
1220,00 feet and North 00° 10' 23" West 5G5.475 feet
froir, the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian? and
running thence North 86° 34' 10" West along an existing
fence line 265.41 feet; thence North 20° 15' 00" West
312.53 feet; thence South 89° 541 19" East 372.18 feet;
thence South 00° 10f 23" East 308.48 feet to the point
of Beginning.
4.

The defendants are awarded attorney's fees in the

amount of $4,000.00, together with their costs of court of $74.00.
DATED this

> &

day of December, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

Ifi

Jicb/^

* >

fact-fa

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

The foregoing Judgment
approved as to form:

V U>^/
V?c.l£j

DAVIDI H. BROADBENT
SALLEY McMINIMEE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

ROBERT C.

CUMMINGS

Attorney for Defendants

-4-

J?y

°1i

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent (0442)
Thomas M. Melton (4999)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID K. BROADBENT

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil NO.920009436CV
Judge Robin Reese

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:
)

ss.

Affiant, being duly sworn, does depose and state as
follows:
1.

I am over 21 years of age, represented the

Covingtons in a prior action against the defendants herein, and
am familiar with the matters referred to herein and the facts of
-1-

BiHlBlT "6"

this case.
2.

On several occasions prior to the trial regarding

the right-of-way claimed by the Josephsons across the Covingtons'
property, and on at least one occasion during the trial, Mr.
Cummings, their attorney, represented to me and to the court that
the Josephsons would pay any taxes and water assessments which
were due on their parcel.

He stated to the court (and the

Covingtons and their counsel agreed) that the case before the
court was to determine the existence of the right-of-way which
was the subject of the action.

There was no issue or question

regarding payments under the installment sales contract under
which the right-of-way was claimed, as the Covingtons
acknowledged that no further amounts were owed to them under said
contract.

No evidence was presented by either side at the trial

regarding any taxes or water assessments owed with regard to the
Josephsons' property.

In fact, the Josephsons presented no

evidence at the trial.
3.

Consistent with and in furtherance of the

Josephsons' statements that they would pay the taxes and water
assessments owed, I delivered to Mr. Cummings the letter dated
June 5, 1992, which is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A",
and received in response his letter dated June 22, 1992, which is
attached as Exhibit "B".

On no occasion did Mr. Cummings dispute
-2-

the Josephson's obligation to pay the taxes and assessments
referred to in the letters•
DATED this

>"

day of December, 1992.

JL

\<£^^vJL\4rttf

David K. Broadbent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this cSu

» / ^

day of

December, 1992.

Notttfy Public

J

ZsZdL
u?A"
Notary'Public
'
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah

on?fS^paa:eaiCi tsco i
*-.... ^c;iy,ULLh£4111 J
'&£, 1995
I
tateofUtah
I
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
4^
I hereby certify that on the rQi/ day of December,
1992, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. BROADBENT to the
following:
Gordon Madsen, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
1130 West Center Street
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
and telecopied a copy to him at 298-9460.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
A RROrESSlONAL CO»»0«AT»ON

LAWYERS
momtmr M . Y C A T C S
DAVID ft. O C t O X * H L C »
0€**tS R. M © » » * L L
J O N C . MCATOK
J O H N P. A f t M T O N
R O N A L D r. SYSAK
WlCHAHO L. » L A N C *
J O N N M. » H A O L C r
O. JAY G * M * t - E
C. C « A I O L»t-JCNOUf5T
j . N A N D A U CAUL
J O H N S . CMtNOLUNO
•WILLIAM A. M t * D E « S . J *
O e © r r » C Y w. M A N C U M

J A M C I A. » O t V t » f
RONALD C

NCMMINC

D*V?D K. t»CUO»IWT
THOMAS J . CWRIN

ftAMUCL ALBA
M. DAVID C C K C » » L C Y
*ORE»T
CA*L

C

CITY CENTRE I , SUITE 9 0 0

6»« MAIN

S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H 6-4III

RARK CITY, U T A H

TELEPHONE (BOI) 52-4-IOOO

WING

STREET

P. O. BOX 3 6
MOfiO

(SOI) 6 4 9 7 4 4 0
OF C O U N S E L
LTLE M. W A * D

W. » A W T O N

THOMAS

RARK C»TY o r r i c c

175 EAST FOURTH SOUTH

M. M E L T O N

G W C G O W Y t . LiNDLCr
DON « . S C M O w
SALLV S U C K M * M I N l M E E
»OGE« J . M«CON*l£
CWAIG J . W A N G t O A V O

TELECOPIER
<SOt) 5 2 * * l O » 9

J u n e 5 , 1992

r. s . M I N C E

(ieio-i©»i)
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-lie "A"
HAND DELIVERED
Robert C. Cummings
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Covington v. John C. Josephson - Property Taxes

Dear Bob:
As I mentioned to you during our recent telephone
conversation, the Covingtons were required to pay the
Josephson's property taxes on May 12, 1992 in order to conclude
the sale of the Covington property. That payment, in the
amount of $3,377.15, was required in order to clear the tax
liens from their property. Copies of the receipt and
redemption certificates are included with this letter. In
addition to taxes, the Josephsons still owe for water share
assessments from 1987 to the present. These amounts are as
follows:
The 1987 assessment of $2.15 per share was paid on
November 30, 1987, totalling $11.25 for the Josephson's five
shares. Interest on this amount through June 6, 1992 is $5.09.
The 1988 assessment was paid January 19, 1989, in the
amount of $23.75, or $4.75 per share. Interest to June 6, 1992
is $8.03.

>^CE, Y E A T E S & G E L D Z A H L E R

Robert C. Curoraings
June 5, 1992
Page 2
The 1989 assessment was paid March 15, 1990 in the
amount of $24.05 at the rate of $4.81 per share. Interest to
June 6, 1992 is $5.36.
The 1990 assessment was paid February 25, 1991 at the
rate of $4.50 per share for a total of $22.50. Interest to
June 6, 1992 is $2.88.
These amounts, including interest at the statutory
contract rate of 10% per year total $102.91 as of June 6, 1992.
The Covingtons feel that they have given ample time to
the Josephsons to arrange to take care of this matter, and that
because the Josephsons have not done so, the Covingtons have
been forced to pay the taxes themselves and now obtain
reimbursement from the Josephsons.
Please contact me as soon as possible to arrange for
payment.
Sincerely,
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ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorney * L«w

2 2 5 SOUTH SECOND EAST
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH B4111
TELEPHONE

June 22,

1992

(801)322-1141

Ms. Sally McMinimee
Mr. David Broadbent
Attorneys at Law
175 East 4th South #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Mr. J o h n

nr^ii
EXH!BiT."B

Josephson

Dear Sally and David:
I spoke with John and told him that the figures on the taxes were
coming. I also forwarded to him DayeJ^s letter outlining the
amounts, but I find that John is/^u^of town for a few weeks. I
will make contact as soon as I can and get back to you.
Thank you.
Very t r u l y "

tfours,

ROBERT/^. CUMMINGS
ja
6F

Gordon A. Madsen
#2048
Attorney for Defendants
1130 West Center Street
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
Telephone: (801) 298-6610
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 'CIRCUIT C0UR# OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through it's
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and Mary
C. Wheaton,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/EMOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil/fjo. 92 000943 6CV

JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Judge: Robin W. Reese

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
)

ss.

JOHN C. JOSEPHSON, upon his oath deposes and says:
1.

That I am one of the Defendants named in the above-

entitled action, and aver the facts set out below from my own
direct knowledge.
2.

That I fully performed my duties under the Uniform

Real Estate Contract referred to in Plaintiffs' Complaint, making
the final payment May 18, 1989 as demonstrated by the attached
statement of Draper Bank, marked Exhibit

n

An

and

incorporated

herein by reference as though set out in full.
3.

The Third District court in the case involving the

same Plaintiffs and Defendants, Civil No. C-89-3339, Judge Richard

EXHIBIT "H M

H. Moffat, presiding, in its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law,

stated at Finding #6.
"The Uniform
full."

Real Estate Contract has been paid

in

A copy of the court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law are
attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by
reference as though set out in full.
4.

While those Findings and the Judgment attached to

Plaintiffs' Memorandum make it obvious, I further state that my
Answer

filed

in that

action

alleged

full performance

of the

contract by me, and Plaintiffs' Reply denied such performance, and
that issue was directly tried by the District court, giving rise to
the above-quoted Finding.

Subscribed and sworn to Defore me, a Notary Public this
16th day of October, 1992.
r;o*r^\f PUBLIC
STATE OF UTAH

Out

My Commission Expires
August 3,1996

5TARY PUBLIC

KIMBERLY WRIGHT
147 North 200 Wwt
Sail UkeCtfy.Uah 34103

Residing at:

My commission expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit
to

David

K.

Broadbent

and

Thomas

M.

Melton,

attorneys

for

Plaintiffs, at their address, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 16th day of October,

1992.

NO.

DRAPER/^
Buyer_

John C Josephson
8560 Danish Rd
Sandy, Utah 84092

Sellers

D«tA»f« WT»W

Douglas B Covington
8500 Danish Rd
s&ftdy, Utah—84070

942-3338

13, 830.00

Contract Amount
Unpaid Balance

Principal
& Interest .

110.00

Payment

At,

Escrow .

8%

Interest

Buyer.

S/C

Date of Contract

Checking

Interest From

Savings

Seller.

82-00748-5

5.00

105.00

At:.

C/C
OTHER DISBURSEMENT:

5 days^ctiarge 5\ OO^lafe charge

ACCOUNT NO.

)ATE

PAYMENT

-9-87 460.00
-15-81 575.00
-11-87 230.00

ESCROW

INTEREST
AMOUNT

79.19
86.75
28.40

225.00
110.00

25.72
11.53_

225.06
1-88
345.00
-88
225.00
L5-88
•1-88 230.00
455.00
-27-881
2-89
220.00
8-89
97.79
d in t u l l

0-1-8
-28-8'

PAID TO

2-10-87
7-10- 8
9-10-87

S/C

TAX*
INSURANCE

MISC

PRINCIPAL

365.18
473.25
201.60

late 15.00
late J 5.00

BALANCE

2603.99
2130.74
1929.14
1729.86

11-101h87
12-10-8
late

1636.39

21.82
28.77
15.15
12.42
19.32

3-10-88 late 5
5-10-88
late
7-10-88 late 5 J
9-10-88 late 1
1-10-89 late 151

1438.21
1136.98
932.13
724.55
303.87

2.02
1.90

2-10-89
5-18-89

^O ^7C/g,y

10.00 closing fee

"Jft

i /

217^8

f

89

85.8

§0

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent (0442)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

The Estate of DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 920009436CV

vs.

Judge Robin W. Reese

JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

DAVID K. BROADBENT, having been first duly sworn and
put under oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

Since 1979, I have been a member in good standing

of the Utah State Bar and admitted to practice before all state
and federal courts in the State of Utah.

I am a shareholder in

the law firm of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler and have represented

EXHIBIT

the plaintiff in this action and, as such, I have personal
knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit.
2.

I have been responsible for conducting this

litigation on behalf of the plaintiff, and I am familiar with the
legal services that have been performed on their behalf.

Those

legal services have been performed by me and others working
directly with me.
3.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a

detailed itemization of the specific legal services performed by
the law firm of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler with regard to this
matter, and only this matter, as of January 4, 1993.

The

itemization reflects the attorney or paralegal performing those
legal services, the time spent, their hourly rate, the nature of
the services provided, and the cost to the plaintiff.

As

detailed in the attached schedule, our services included the
obtaining of information about the claims and defenses from our
client and other sources, analyzing the claims and defenses,
preparing the necessary summons and complaint, researching legal
issues, preparing our motion for summary judgment and
accompanying memorandum, preparing memorandum and affidavits to
respond to defendants' motion for summary judgment, and arguing
the matter to the Court.

-2-

4.

The plaintiff has incurred court costs in the

amount of $131.40 and legal fees in the amount of $3,127.50 in
litigating this matter.

The billing rates for the attorneys and

the paralegal involved in these matters are reasonable for the
type of work performed, and the amount of time and effort
expended in pursuing this matter was reasonable and prudently
required in order to fairly present the plaintiff's case to the
Court.
5.

I am familiar with the attorneys' fees and costs

charged by attorneys in Salt Lake City, Utah for legal services
of this kind, and in my opinion the services described above, and
the fees and costs charged therefor, are reasonable.
DATED this

£j*r

day of January, 1993.

DAVID K. BROADBENT

,^rday of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^J?/
January, 1993.
J»'cte7 P'.:b!:c

"1
/
NOTARY PUBLIC
^
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

v-'K^y
[JJ^ebiimiiss^or^x^iires :J
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the

r^h^

day of January,

1993, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees to the
following:
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq,
Attorney at Law
1130 West Center Street
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054

-4

-4-
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ATTACHMENT TO AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
Calculation of Fees and Costs
FEES:
DATE

NAME

TIME

AMOUNT

DESCRIPTION

05/13/92

DKB*

.30

$ 42.00

05/19/92

DKB

.20

28.00

Conference with client; review
tax calculations

06/05/92

DKB

.60

84.00

Prepare calculations; telephone
conference with Bob Covington;
telephone conference with Bob
Cummings, attorney for
Josephson, prepare letter to
Cummings

06/29/92

DKB

.30

42.00

Telephone conference with Robert
Covington; review letter from
Cummings; meet with Tom Melton
regarding commencing litigation

06/29/92

TMM*

1.00

110.00

07/01/92

TMM

.50

55.00

07/03/92

TMM

1.20

132.00

07/06/92

TMM

.20

22.00

Draft complaint & summons,
arrange for service

09/01/92

LP*

.50

25.00

Conference with Tom Melton re
preparation of motion for
summary j udgment, review
pleadings and claims regarding
summary judgment motion and memo

09/03/92

LP

.50

25.00

Review pleadings, prepare motion
for summary judgment

09/08/92

LP

5.70

285.00

prepare summary judgment motion;
draft memorandum in support and
research legal issues

Telephone conferences with
Robert Covington re payment of
Josephson's property taxes and
assessments at sale of property,
discuss reimbursement issues

Review contract and
correspondence re complaint for
reimbursement of taxes paid
Review claims, draft complaint
Draft complaint

DATE

NAME

TIME

AMOUNT
345,00

DESCRIPTION

09/09/92

LP

6,90

09/15/92

LP

6.10

305.00

Finalize morion and supporting
memorandum for summary judgment;
conference with Tom Melton re
same

09/23/92

TMM

2.00

220.00

Revise motion and memo of
summary judgment. Conference
with Lisa Peck re same

09/23/92

LP

.30

15.00

Review of summary judgment memo;
conference with Tom Melton re
revisions to same

09/24/92

LP

.50

25.00

Revise memo in support for
summary judgment

12/29/92

DKB

4.8

672.00

review pleadings from prior
litigation re res judicata
issue, review defendant's
response memorandum and
affidavits, prepare memorandum
in opposition to defendant's
motion for summary judgment,
prepare affidavits, 40 Bob
Cummings re possible testimony,
review closing statement re
taxes paid at closing, review
tax notices and calculation of
taxes due, meet with Mary
Whetman regarding her affidavit
and discussions with title
company re payment of taxes and
assessments, prepare for hearing

12/30/92

DKB

.6

84.00

review depositions, prepare
affidavits, prepare for hearing

01/4/93

DKB

1.9

266.00

01/07/93

KF*

.60

31.20
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Research re summary judgment and
draft same re res judicata
issues and breach of contract
claim; edit/revise motion

prepare for hearing, argue
motion for summary judgment
Conference/meeting with David
Broadbent; review file,
pleadings, memo from David
Broadbent and records re
attorneys fees and costs

DATE

NAME

TIME

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

01/08/93

KF

2.00

104.00

Drafting Order and Judgment,
obtain information for and
prepare draft of Affidavit of
Attorneys' Fees

01/08/93

DKB

1.50

210.00

review and revise order and
judgment, edit affidavit of
attorneys fees

$3,127.50

FEE TOTALS

* Attorneys:
DKB — David K. Broadbent, hourly rate: $140.00
TMM — Thomas M. Melton, hourly rate: $110.00
LP — Lisa Peck, hourly rate: $50.00
Paralegal:
KF — Karen Fisher, hourly rate $52.00
COSTS:
Filing Fee
Constable Fees for Service
Photocopies

$ 40.00
71.00
20.40
$131.40

TOTAL COSTS
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